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Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 -
Judicial Review of Administrative Rulings
Marshall J. Wolf* and Donald M. Robiner**
PERSONS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY A DECISION OF ANY OFFICER,
board, commission or other division of the great number of
political subdivisions of the State usually encounter difficulty in
appealing such decision. This fact has long troubled the judiciary
of Ohio. Thus, adoption in 1957 of Chapter 2506 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code- Appeals From Orders of Administrative Officers and
Agencies- was immediately welcomed by the courts as providing
assistance to those citizens who found themselves adverse to, and
totally at the mercy of, their government.1 Although Ohio Revised
Code, Chapter 2506, radically changed the procedure with respect
to appeals from boards and commissions below the state level,2 the
courts recognized the need for such change since frequently these
local boards consist of non-legally trained personnel who, "almost
universally, are part-time officials." 3 The procedures utilized by local
boards and commissions oftentimes were so devoid of guarantees
of due process of law for citizens appearing before them that at
least one court, in commenting on the total lack of safeguards avail-
able to litigants was constrained to conclude that:
A litigant ought not suffer the consequences of a procedure
that is so loose and indefinite.4
*B.A., Miami Univ.; J.D., Western Reserve Univ.; Member of the Ohio Bar; Associate Mem-
ber of the Cuyahoga County Law Directors Association.
*A.B., Univ. of Michigan; J.D., Western Reserve Univ.; Member of the Ohio Bar; Former
Assistant Director of Law, City of Mayfield Heights; Associate Member of the Cuyahoga
County Law Directors Association.
I Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of App., 168 Ohio St. 113, 151 N.E.2d 533 (1958).
2 Schlagheck v. Winterfeld, 108 Ohio App. 299, 304, 161 N.E.2d 498, 502 (1958).
1 Broad-Miami Co. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 140, 154, 185 N.E.2d
76,84 (1959).
4 Chester Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Kline, 19 Ohio App.2d 63, 66, 249 N.E.2d 921, 924
(1969).
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Ohio Revised Code §2506.01 establishes the scope of Chapter
2506 and provides:
Every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer,
tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department
or other division of any political subdivision of the state
may be reviewed by the common pleas court of the county
in which the principal office of the political subdivision is
located, as provided in sections 2505.01 to 2505.45, inclusive,
of the Revised Code, and as such procedure is modified by
sections 2506.01 to 2506.04, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
The appeal provided in sections 2506.01 to 2506.04, inclu-
sive, of the Revised Code is in addition to any other remedy
of appeal provided by law.
A 'final order, adjudication, or decision' does not include
any order from which an appeal is granted by rule, ordi-
nance, or statute to a higher administrative authority and
a right to a hearing on such appeal is provided; any order
which does not constitute a determination of the rights,
duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a speci-
fied person; nor any order issued preliminary to or as a
result of a criminal proceeding.
Ohio's Supreme Court has pointed out that Chapter 2506 was
enacted by the Ohio General Assembly largely to adquately accom-
modate "the growing volume of zoning and building litigation con-
fronting our courts and arising from adversary proceedings in
respect to the interpretation and administration of urban and rural
zoning and building ordinances."5 Nevertheless, there can be no
question but that the applicability of Chapter 2506 as set forth in
§2506.01 applies to the final orders, adjucations or decision of any
and alt officers, tribunals, authorities, board, bureaus, etc. of any
and all political subdivisions of the state or local governments. So
long as a quasi-judicial as opposed to either a purely legislative or
purely administrative function is being performed, the common
pleas court is authorized to hear the matter on appeal according to
a statutorily defined procedure.6
5 State x rel Sibarco Corp. v. Berea, 7 Ohio St. 2d 85 at 90, 218 N.E.2d 428 (1966).
'M. J. Kelly Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Ohio St.2d 150, 290 N.E.2d 562 (1972). As to discussion
of distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial functions and the inapplicability of
OHIo REV. Cons, ch. 2506, to purely legislative matters see Myers v. Schiering, 27 Ohio
St.2d 11, 271 N.E.2d 864 (1971); Donnelly v. Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St.2d 1, 233
N.E.2d 500 (1968); Jacobs v. Maddux, 7 Ohio St. 2d 21, 218 N.B2d 460 (1966);
Tuber v. Perkins, 6 Ohio St.2d 155, 216 N.E.2d 877 (1966); Berg v. Struthers, 176
Ohio St. 146, 198 N.E.2d 48 (1964); Remy v. Kines, 175 Ohio St. 197, 191 N.E.2d 837
(1963); Espy v. Montgomery, 30 Ohio App,2d 65, 233 N.E.2d 177 (1971); Stocker
v. Wood, 18 Ohio App.2d 34, 246 N.E.2d 592 (1969); Szymanaki v. Toledo, 18 Ohio
App-2d 11, 246 N.E2d 368 (1969); In re Latham, 5 Ohio App.2d 187, 214 N.E.2d
(Continued on next page)
[VoI. 22:229
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol22/iss2/4
CHAPTER 2506
Thus, the provisions of Chapter 2506 have been held to apply
to appeals involving the refusal to grant a continuing contract to
a teacher by a board of education;' the firing of striking public
employees by county commissioners;' the firing of employees of
county general hospitals by hospital trustees;9 the decisions of a
county board of elections;" the decisions of a civil service com-
mission ;" the suspension of a police officer by a safety director ;2 the
decisions of township trustees regarding incorporation pursuant to
Ohio Revised Code §§707.15 and 707.16;13 and an unfavorable rul-
ing from the Public Utilities Commission on a complaint filed under
Ohio Revised Code §4905.26.14
Planning Commissions, Boards of Zoning Appeals,
and Building Commissions
Unquestionably, however, the most frequent application of Chap-
ter 2506 comes in matters involving zoning, planning and building
situations, and the boards under whose jurisdiction these matters
fall. Members of these supposed quasi-judicial bodies often view
their roles as that of enforcers of local zoning ordinances rather
than as members of an impartial appeal agency. Under these con-
ditions, it is not at all unusual to find the barest rudiments of due
process of law frequently lacking and applicants badly confused as
to their rights.
When appearing before these boards, applicants are often
afraid to "run the risk of irritating" the board by introducing
evidence or requesting procedural safeguards. 5 It is not uncommon
to have a municipality attempt to justify its refusal to even pro-
(Continued from preceding page)
681 (1965); Bieger v. Moreland Hills, 2 Ohio App.2d 32, 209 N.E.2d 218 (1965);
In r Ciements, 2 Ohio App,2d 201, N.E.2d 573 (1965); In re McDonald, 119 Ohio
App. 15, 196 N.E.2d 333 (1963).
7Crabtnee v. Board of Education, 26 Ohio App.2d 237, 270 N.E.2d 688 (1970), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
Abbott v. Meyers, 20 Ohio App.2d 65, 251 N.E.2d 869 (1969); Adkins v. Meyers, 15
Ohio Misc. 91, 239 N.F.2d 239 (1968); Fleming v. Myers, 15 Ohio Misc. 205, 240
N.E.2d 511 (1968), aff'd 20 Ohio App.2d 65, 251 N.E.2d 869 (1969).
'Bell v. Board of Trustees of Lawrence County General Hospital, 21 Ohio App.2d 49,
254 N.E.2d 711 (1969).
10 State ex tel. Cullinan v. Board of Elections, 28 Ohio App.2d 281, 277 N.E.2d 448 (1968);
State ex rel. Smith v. Johnson, 12 Ohio App.2d 87, 231 N.E.2d 81 (1967).
" State ex rel. Marsall v. Civil Service Cnmm'n, 14 Ohio St.2d 266, 237 N.E.2d 392 (1968),
reversing, 11 Ohio App.2d 84, 228 N.E.2d 913 (1967).
12 State ox rel. Conant v. Jones, 176 Ohio St. 147, 197 N.E.2d 897 (1964).
"Petitioners v. Board of Twp. Trustees, 4 Ohio App.2d 171, 211 N.E.2d 880 (1965).
14 State ex rel. Coury v. Ohio Bell Tel, Co., 172 Ohio St. 309, 175 N.E.2d 511 (1961).
SMentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 168 Ohio St. 113, 151 N.E.2d 533, 537
(1958); Capello v. Mayfield Heights, 27 Ohio St.2d 1, 6, 270 N.E.2d 831, 834 (1971)
(Schneider, J., concuring).
1973]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
duce its building inspector before a board of zoning appeals which
is hearing an appeal of the inspector's decision on a particular
application on the grounds that "all the public officials of the city
...were apparently of one mind ...and for the city to formally
state its position would be an exercise in futility."16 In spite of these
inconsistencies, applicants who hesitate to expose their entire case
before the board during a procedurally defective hearing are deemed
by the board to have failed to meet their burden of proof and the
appeals are generally denied.
In order to provide relief to litigants finding themselves in
what could be an impossible situation, Chapter 2506 establishes a
formal appellate procedure whereby the common pleas court may
review the actions of these officials and boards and determine whether
... the order, adjudication or decision is unconstitutional,
illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported
by the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative
evidence on the whole record. . . 17
Procedural Due Process
While the cases arising under Chapter 2506 indicate that the
courts have begun to provide safeguards of procedural due process
to litigants in matters where the courts have taken evidence beyond
that presented to the board, the courts have neither limited them-
selves to the statutorily defined issue in Ohio Revised Code §2506.04,
nor seized the opportunity to dispose of cases in a way designed to
provide an incentive for administrative officials to adopt and adhere
to the procedures contemplated by the Act at the hearing level.
As we will attempt to show, these decisions prevent the reduction
of the number of cases appealed, and, in fact, cause a multiplicity
of hearings on the same matter to the severe disadvantage of the
individual litigant.
Prior to the effective date of Chapter 2506,18 no appeals from
administrative decisions of political subdivisions of the state to
the courts were provided for under the Ohio Revised Code, and
... the action of a board of zoning adjustment either in
granting or denying a variance, was final in the sense that
it could be questioned only by way of an action in man-
damus in which event the test was whether or not the
Board was guilty of an abuse of discretion.9
'6 Developers Diversified v, Ijlighiand Heights, #897, 602, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas
Court (Appellees' supplemental brief).
"OHIo REV. CODE §2506.04 (Page Supp. 1972)
"September 16, 1957.
"Broad-Miami Co. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 89 Ohio LAbs. 140, 185 N.E.2d 76, 78
(emphasis in original opinion).
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By enacting the "Administrative Appellate Procedure Act," as
Chapter 2506 is commonly known, the legislature has provided a
new remedy in the ordinary course of law, thereby severely limiting
the number of actions in mandamus.2 Further, this remedy has
changed the test to be applied to a board's decision from "abuse of
discretion" to whether the board's decision falls into one of the
prohibited categories of Ohio Revised Code §2506.04.21 In order to
determine whether the procedures before the administrative official
or board have caused or contributed to the unreasonableness of the
decision appealed from, the Code now enumerates certain specific
indicia of procedural due process of law, the absence of which per-
mits the common pleas court to take additional evidence and there-
after make its decision based upon the transcript of the hearing
below and the evidence received by the court.Y
Ohio Revised Code §2506.03 provides:
§2506.03 - Hearing of appeal.
The hearing of such appeal shall proceed as in the trial of
a civil action but the court shall be confined to the tran-
script as filed pursuant to Section 2506.02 of the Revised
Code unless it appears on the face of said transcript or by
affidavit filed by the appellant that:
(A) The transcript does not contain a report of all evi-
dence admitted or proffered by the appellant.
(B) The appellant was not permitted to appear and be
heard in person or by his attorney in opposition to
the order appealed from:
(1) To present his position, arguments and conten-
tions;
(2) To offer and examine witnesses and present evi-
dence in support thereof;
(3) To cross-examine witnesses purporting to refute
his position, arguments and contentions;
21 State ex rel. Marshall v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 14 Ohio St.2d 226, 237 N.E.2d 392 (1968);
State ex rel. Sibarco Corp. v. Berea, 7 Ohio St.2d 85, 218 N.E.2d 428 (1966), cart. denied,
386 U.S. 957 (1967); State ex rtel, Sibarco Corp, v. Hicks, 177 Ohio St. 81, 202 N.E.2d
615 (1964); State ox rel. Ftedrix v. Beachwood, 17i1 Ohio St. 343, 170 NE.2d 847
(1960); State ex ral. Gund Co. v. Solon, 171 Ohio St. 318, 170 N-E.2d 487 (1960); State
ex rel. Grant v. Kiefaber, 114 Ohio App. 279, 181 N.E.2d 905 (1960), aff'd, 171 Ohio
St. 326, 170 N.E.2d 848 (1960); State ex ee. 12501 Superior Corp. v. E. Cleveland, 81
Ohio LAbs- 177, 158 N.E.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1959).
11 Broad-Miami Co. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 89 Ohio LAbs. 140, 144, 185 N.E.2d
76, 78 (C.P. 1959).
220141o REV ConE §2506-03 (Page Ssipp. 1972).
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(4) To offer evidence to refute evidence and testi-
mony offered in opposition to his position, argu-
ments and contentions;
(5) To proffer any such evidence into the record, if
the admission thereof is denied by the officer or
body appealed from.
(C) The testimony adduced was not given under oath.
(D) The appellant was unable to present evidence by reason
of a lack of the power of subpoena by the officer or
body appealed from or the refusal, after request, of
such officer or body to afford the appellant opportunity
to use the power of subpoena when possessed by the
officer or body.
(E) The officer or body failed to file with the transcript
conclusions of fact supporting the order, adjudication
or decision appealed from;[,] in which case, the court
shall hear the appeal upon the transcript and such ad-
ditional evidence as may be introduced by any party.
At the hearing, any party may call as if on cross-
examination, any witness who previously gave testi-
mony in opposition to such party.
In applying (A) of Ohio Revised Code §2506.03, the courts
have necessarily also reviewed Ohio Revised Code §2506.02.23 Syl-
labus 2 in Fleischman v. Medina Supply Company states:
Where, in such appeal, the transcript of the proceedings
furnished the court by the agency, as provided by Section
2506.02, Revised Code, does not contain all the evidence
submitted to it on the trial of the issue before the agency,
as provided by paragraph "(A)" of Section 2506.03, Re-
vised Code, . . . the court is required to hear such addi-
tional evidence that may be introduced by either party in
the proceedings on appeal. 4
The transcript in Fleischman was categorized as being "a
scanty resume of the proceedings before the board which falls
short of the statutory requirement."25 Even in cases where the
m OHIo REV. CODE §2506.02 provides:
Within thirty days after filing the notice of appeal, the officer or body from
which the appeal is taken shall, upon the filing or a praecipe, prepare and file in
the court to which the appeal is taken, a complete transcript of all the original
papers, testimony and evidence offered, heard and taken into consideration in
issuing the order appealed from. The costs of such transcript shall be taxed as
a part of costs of the appeal.
2111 Ohio App. 449, 173 N.E.2d 168, 169 (1960).
25Id. at 452, 173 N.E.2d at 171.
[Vol. 22:229
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transcript filed with the court included lengthy detailed narratives
of each and every argument presented by counsel together with a
report of the dialogue between board members and remarks made
by other witnesses, additional evidence has been allowed in reliance
upon Ohio Revised Code §2506.03(A).26 While it is hard to con-
ceive of any transcript of a hearing being "complete," unless the
record is a verbatim report taken by a court reporter or trans-
scribed by a mechanical recording device, no court has, as yet,
expressly stated that such record is what is required to satisfy
Ohio Revised Code §2506.03(A). Instead, there is a case-by-case
approach which almost always allows additional evidence before the
common pleas court. The courts have failed to provide a judicially
acceptable state-wide standard which is essential in view of the
vast number and diversity of local quasi-judicial boards, commis-
sions and agencies throughout Ohio. As a result, more and more
actions filed pursuant to Chapter 2506 require the taking of addi-
tional testimony before the court which defeats the intended "apel-
late" nature of the proceeding.27
Cases which have applied the remaining paragraphs of Ohio
Revised Code §2506.03, have also revealed a willingless by the courts
to admit additional evidence coupled with a resistance affirmatively
to state what constitutes an acceptable hearing procedure which
would allow the court to reach its decision based solely upon the
transcript filed in accordance with Ohio Revised Code §2506.02.
Only the case of In Re Appeal of Manning2 considered the common
pleas decision as an attempt to re-try the issues of fact and sub-
stitute the lower court's judgment for that of the board. As a
result, reliance is placed on Manning by appellees in Chapter 2506
proceedings in attempting to limit additional evidence which might
be introduced. The court in Manning, however, first had determined
as a matter of law that a complete transcript of the proceedings
before the board had, in fact, been filed. Thus, although the courts
generally pay lip service to the theory that proceedings under
Chapter 2506 do not contemplate trial de novo, Manning is rarely
followed with a court limiting itself to the transcript, since the
appeal is to be heard "upon the transcript and such additional evi-
dence as may be introduced by either party."29
26VIad v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning, 111 Ohio App. 70, 164 N.E.2d 797 (1960); Susman
v. Cleveland, 111 Ohio App. 18, 162 N.E.2d 225 (1959).
"See, e.g., In re Messiah Lutheran Church, 28 Ohio St.2d 52, 275 N.E.26 608 (1971).
A small number of local governments, in anticipation of an eventual requirement of a
verbatim transcript have begun to utilize tape recorders or other mechanical devices in
preparing the transcript. In so doing, they have oftentimes successfully prevented the
presentation of additionl evidence to the court by appellants who have "held back" their
best evidence in anticipation of the court hearing.
117 Ohio App. 55, 189 N.E.2d 651 (1962).
29OHIo REv. CODE §2506.03 (Page Supp. 1972).
1973]
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Appeals from proceedings before an administrative board based
upon Ohio Revised Code §2506.03(C) illustrate the courts' attempts
to protect litigants' rights of procedural due process without stat-
ing affirmatively what is required of hearing boards. The Supreme
Court of Ohio in Arcaro Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Zoning Board of
Appeals" held that a decision of an administrative agency was not
supported by a preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative
evidence when that evidence was in the form of unsworn testimony.
Arcaro involved an appeal to the zoning board of appeals by a land
owner concerning revocation of a non-conforming use permit. At
the board, the action of the building commissioner was affirmed,
based in part upon unidentified statements apparently from the
audience. These statements, of course, were unsworn. The chair-
man of the zoning board of appeals had, in fact, refused permission
to swear witnesses. On appeal pursuant to Chapter 2506, the Ham-
ilton County Common Pleas Court affirmed the decision of the zon-
ing board without taking additional evidence. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. In reversing, the Supreme Court referred to Ohio Revised
Code §2317.3031 and concluded:
Thus, the record in this appeal contains no evidence. Hence,
the decision of the board was not supported "by the pre-
ponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence
on the whole record."
Section 2506.04, Revised Code.
32
Ohio Revised Code Chapters 2506 and 119 -Identity of Purpose
Since Artaro it has been recognized that there exists an identity
of purpose between Chapter 2506 and Chapter 119 of the Revised
Code. Chapter 119, the Administrative Procedure Act, deals with
appeals from decisions of administrative agencies of the State.33
Accordingly, cases which describe what is or is not substantial,
reliable or probative evidence under Chapter 119, Revised Code,
have equal bearing in cases brought under Chapter 2506. In Doelker
v. Accountancy Board," the rationale of Arcaro was adopted and
expanded in an appeal pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Chapter 119
and the Supreme Court identified another situation which it found
violative of procedural due process.
117 Ohio St.2d 32, 218 N.E.2d 179 (1966).
31 "Before testifying a witness shall be sworn to testify to the truth and nothing but the truth."
ZArco Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 7 Ohio St.2d 32, 33-34, 213 N.E.2d
179, 180 (1966).
33Hale v. Board of Educ., 13 Ohio St.2d 92, 234 N.E.2d 583 (1968),
34 12 Ohio Sr.2d 76, 232 N.E.2d 407 (1967).
[Vol. 22:229
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Doelker involved an appeal from a determination of the Ohio
Accountancy Board revoking Doelker's certificate to practice as a
certified public accountant. The appeal was taken to the common
pleas court pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §119.12.11 No evidence
was offered in the common pleas court in addition to that contained
in the record as certified by the Accountancy Board. In reversing
the decision of the common pleas court which had affirmed the de-
cision of the Accountancy Board, the court of appeals found that
the decision of the board was not supported by reliable, probative
and substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the court of appeals and stated:
* . . a Common Pleas Court, on an appeal from an order of
an agency revoking a license [is authorized] to affirm that
order of the agency only "if it finds, upon consideration of
the entire record and such additional evidence as the court
has admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, pro-
bative and substantial evidence and is in accordance with
law." This means that such evidence must not only exist,
but must be in the record in order to support an affirmance.
Arcaro Brothers, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals (1966)
7 Ohio St. 2d 32, 33, 218 N.E.2d 179.
37
Following Doelker the Franklin County Court of Appeals con-
tinued the critical analysis of the due process requirements of ad-
ministrative hearings. In re Milton Hardware1 concerned an appeal
from a decision of the common pleas court which had reversed a
determination of the Administrator of the Bureau of Unemployment
Compensation on the basis that the determination of the Adminis-
trator was not supported by reliable, probative and substantial
evidence, and thus was not in accordance with law. The Court of
Appeals was confronted with questions arising out of the conduct
of the proceedings before the administrative officer.
Questioned basically [were] the activities of such hearing
officers in the conduct of hearings and the alleged absence
of adherence to evidentialy rules or rules of court procedure?9
"OHIo REV. CODE §119.12 provides, in part:
The court may affirm the order... if it finds, upon consideration of the entire
record and such additional evidence as the court has admitted, that the order is
supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and is in accordance
with law. In the absence of such a finding, it may teverse, vacate, or modify the
order or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative and
substantial evidence and is in accordance with law ...
36Doelker v. Accountancy Bd., 12 Ohio St.2d 76, 78, 232 N.E.2d 407, 409 (1967).
'lid. at 80, 232 N.E.2d at 410 (emphasis added).
36 19 Ohio App.2d 157, 250 N.E.2d 262 (1969).
9 Id. at 160, 250 N.E.2d at 265 (emphasis added).
i9u8]
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The court first recognized that, generally, an administrative agency
may adopt and follow hearing procedures which are not strictly
according to rules of practice as found in the trial of civil cases.
The Court then concluded:
However, the administrative agencies may not be permitted
to sanction as evidence something which is clearly not evi-
dence. General Motors Corp. v. Baker, 92 Ohio App. 301.
And an administrative agency should not act upon evidence
which is clearly not admissible, competent or probative of
the facts which it is to determine. Eastern Ohio Distribut-
ing Company v. Board of Liquor Control, 59 Ohio L. Abs.
188.40
Following Arcaro, Doelker and Milton Hardware Co., one would
have expected that administrative boards sitting in a quasi-judicial
capacity would have routinely sworn witnesses. The "voice in the
audience" type of testimony should no longer be permitted nor should
administrative officials be excused from setting forth the basis for
their decisions. Since these cases failed to establish guidelines upon
which the vast number of administrative tribunals could rely, ad-
ditional litigation resulted requiring the Supreme Court to reiterate
its position in Capello v. Mayfield Heights.1
Capello v. Mayfield Heights
Capello involved an application for a building permit for an
auto wash with gasoline pumps in a commercially-zoned area. The
building commissioner refused the requested permit on the basis
that the zoning ordinance placed gas stations in a different use
classification and made no provision for auto washes or a com-
bination auto wash and gasoline station. An appeal was taken to
the board of zoning appeals where lengthy discussions occurred
between the applicant, his counsel, and the board. In addition, the
applicant testified and answered the board's questions concerning
the proposed project. Not one witness, not even the building com-
missioner, appeared in support of the commissioner's decision.
Clearly, no oath was administered and the minutes of the proceed-
ings only briefly summarized what had transpired. The board
nevertheless, affirmed the decision of the commissioner.
At the trial before the common pleas court, pursuant to Chap-
ter 2506, the court at first allowed, without objection, extensive
testimony, including that of a real estate expert called by appellant.
Following the expert's testimony, the municipality then sought to
40 1d. at 162, 250 N.E.2d at 266.
4127 Ohio St,2d 1, 271 NE.2d 831 (1971).
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limit the court's findings to the transcript as filed by the board
according to Ohio Revised Code §2506.03. The court, however, con-
tinued to take evidence. Again, the municipality failed to call any
witnesses in support of the decision of the Commissioner and im-
mediately rested. Several days after trial, the court entered the
following judgment:
Based upon the record of proceedings in the transcript filed
in the appeal, and excluding the additional evidence pro-
duced at the time of the final hearing before this court, the
court finds that the determination of the Board of Zoning
Appeals, based upon what evidence it had before it, is rea-
sonable and is supported by reliable and probative evidence,
and is therefore affirmed.4
The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County affirmed without
opinion, and suggested during oral argument that appellants could
have and should have supplied the essential elements of due process
which were lacking at the hearing before the board. Having failed
to alleviate the deficiencies of unsworn testimony, appellants should
not be heard to complain, reasoned the court.43
In this context, the Supreme Court of Ohio was faced clearly
with the issue stated in Ohio Revised Code §2506.04 whether the
decision of the board was unreasonable or unsupported by sub-
stantial, reliable and probative evidence on the whole record. In
deciding whether the duty rests with the quasi-judicial agency or
the litigant to create and maintain procedures which will afford a
forum conducive to due process, permitting a fair and impartial
determination of rights, the Court was in a position to decide
whether, if that duty befalls the administrative tribunal, its failure
constitutes an unreasonable manner of rendering a decision which
is ipso facto unsupported by substantial, reliable and probative evi-
dence on the whole record.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision of the
court of appeals and held that a court reviewing an administrative
ruling cannot affirm that ruling upon a transcript which reveals an
absence of a record of sworn evidence, irrespective of the reason
for such absence." In reaching its decision in Capello, the Court
relied heavily on Arcaro and Doelker in finding fault with proceed-
ings which neither are under oath nor require some evidence, no
42M. at 4 (emphasis supplied).
43While there is no report of this discussion by the Court, except that contained in the
briefs submitted to the Supreme Court, the author, as counsel, participated in the pro-
ceeding throughout.
"Capello v. Mayfield Heights, 27 Ohio St.2d 1, 271 N.E.2d 831 (1971).
1973]
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matter how slight, to be contained in the record in support of the
administrative decision. In rejecting the "waiver" theory followed
by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court squarely placed the
burden of creating and maintaining a proper procedure upon the
reviewing board or agency.
The Courts' Unfinished Business?
As a result of Capello, there should be no question but that a
reviewing court cannot simply affirm an administrative decision
solely on the basis of the hearing before an administrative board
where one of the enumerated defects of Ohio Revised Code §2506.03
has occurred. While this would be a significant advancement of the
rights of litigants appearing before these boards, judicial attention
must now be directed to the manner of disposing of these litigated
matters. Although the mere filing of the affidavit described in Ohio
Revised Code §2506.03 "does not automatically quicken the statu-
tory right nor compel the court of common pleas to take additional
evidence unless the record will support some one of these deficiencies
enumerated in the statute,"45 as previously illustrated, courts usually
have not hesitated to seize the opportunity to take additional evi-
dence. Still, these decisions have not significantly altered the hearing
procedures of the administrative tribunals, resulting in an increase
rather than a desired decrease in the number of cases requiring
additional evidence which will be appealed to the courts. Litigants
continue to be wary of presenting all of their evidence before ad-
ministrative boards whose hearing procedures might be questionable
unless courts frame the ultimate relief in a more affirmative manner.
Ohio Revised Code §2506.04 provides that consistent with the
court's findings
. .. that the order, adjudication or decision is unconstitu-
tional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or unsup-
ported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable and
probative evidence on the whole record ... the court may
affirm, reverse, vacate or modify the order, adjudication or
decision, or remand the cause to the officer or body appealed
from with instruction to enter an order consistent with the
findings or opinion of the court ... (emphasis added).
The above-quoted portion of Ohio Revised Code §2605.04 does
not contemplate a remand to the administrative agency or body to
determine the legal justification of the administrative decision. If the
court finds no such justification, it must make its own conclusion
based upon the record before it. By remanding to administrative
boards without first reaching its own conclusions as to what action
4 12701 Shaker Blvd. Co. v. Cleveland, 31 Ohio App.2d 199, 211, 287 N.E.2d 283 (1972).
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the boards must take, there is no incentive for the boards properly
to proceed in the original instance. It is meaningless to be told by
the courts that, in spite of a successful attack of the decision of an
administrative board, the controversy is remanded back to the
board as was the case in Arcaro.4 6 In his concurring opinion in
Capetlo v. Mayfield Heights, Justice Schneider points out "even to
request a procedural right before an agency [staffed by laymen]
often engenders hostility. '4 Imagine returning to the agency or
board following reversal where the court has stated, in effect, that
the board abused the applicant's procedural rights. Not only is this
probably asking too much of the lay administrative board or agency,
it is not contemplated by Ohio Revised Code §2506.04. Courts must
not merely rely on the remedial and corrective provisions of Ohio
Revised Code §2506.03, but must enter judgments tailored so as to
grant affirmative final relief pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §2506.04
which would announce positive judicial explanations of what pro-
cedures are required in order to create a truly appellate process
limited to review of transcripts filed by the quasi-judicial tribunals
and which would allow litigants to proceed before the board free
from fear and intimidation.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Wary litigants, confused boards and overburdened lower courts
would be greatly assisted if the courts would go further than merely
stating that a decision of an administrative board which has failed
to make available and follow the procedures enumerated in Ohio
Revised Code §2506.03 cannot be affirmed. Courts must be prepared
to reverse administrative decisions and grant final relief to appli-
cants, if appropriate, when the transcript of the administrative
hearing does not contain a preponderance of substantial, reliable
and probative evidence due in part to the failure or refusal of the
tribunal to afford the procedures enumerated in Ohio Revised Code
§2506.03. If the administrative board fails or refuses to follow the
procedures enumerated in Ohio Revised Code §2506.03, such action
should be a basis for a finding by a reviewing court that the decision
below is unreasonable or unsupported by substantial, reliable or pro-
bative evidence, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §2506.04. If, based
upon such finding, the decision is reversed and final relief granted,
litigants need not hestitate in presenting their evidence before the
board since no unfair advantage of a second chance hearing will
be gained by the administrator. While a possible harsh result might
occasionally result, administrative boards and litigants alike would
"4Arcaro Bros. Builders Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 7 Ohio St.2d 32, 218 N.E.2d 179
(1966).
47 Capello v- Mayfield Aeights, 27 Ohio St.2d 1, 271 N.E.2d 831 (1971).
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soon come to understand that full evidentiary hearings which are
procedurally proper are required by statute and enforced by the
courts. Courts will then be called upon less and less to supplement
their appellate function with time-consuming evidentiary hearings.
Such an approach has been recognized in one case under Chap-
ter 2506, and has, in fact, been consistently followed in appeals pur-
suant to Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 119. An important, yet generally
unknown, postscript to Capello v. Mayfield Heights, is the decision
of the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County rendered after the
"further proceedings" of the common pleas court which were man-
dated by the Supreme Court's opinion. In affirming the decision of
the court of common pleas which had granted judgment in favor of
Capello and ordered the building permit to be issued, the Court of
Appeals observed:
A strict interpretation of Capello v. Mayfield Heights [27
Ohio St. 2d 1, 19711 would not permit the Court of Common
Pleas to base its affirmance solely upon the transcript of the
proceedings in the present case. In the absence of any addi-
tional testimony by the Court of Common Pleas, a reversal
of the Board of Zoning Appeals would be in order.48
Thus, at least one court has now indicated that where an affirmance
is impossible, a reversal, together with the granting of final relief, is
required.
A close reading of Doelker v. Accountancy Board4 and In re
Milton Hardware Co." reveals similar results in appeals taken pur-
suant to Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 119. As there was no evidence in
the record to support an affirmance of the decision of the Account-
ancy Board, the revocation of Mrs. Doelker's certificate to practice
was vacated."1 Likewise, when the activities of the hearing officers
in the conduct of the hearings was successfully attacked in Milton
Hardware Co., the determination of the Administrator of the Bureau
of Unemployment Compensation was reversed and set aside.5 2
Ohio Revised Code §119.12 provides, in part, as follows:
The court may affirm the order of the agency complained
of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire
record and such additional evidence as the court has ad-
"8Capello v. Mayfield Heights, No. 31366, Ct. App. Cuyahoga County (Dec, 23, 1971).
49 12 Ohio St.2d 76, 232 N.E.2d 407 (1967).
"19 Ohio App.2d 157, 250 N.E.2d 262 (1969).
"Doelker v. Accountancy Bd., 12 Ohio St. 76, 232 N.E.2d 407 (1967).
'
2 In re Milton Hardware Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 157, 250 N.E.2d 262 (1969).
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mitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative
and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. In
the absence of such a finding, it may reverse, vacate, or
modify the order or make such other ruling as is supported
by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and is in
accordance with law ....
The above-quoted portion of Ohio Revised Code §119.12 is sufficiently
similar to Ohio Revised Code §2506.04 so as to justify reliance on
Doelker and Milton Hardware for purposes of framing final relief
just as those case are relied upon with respect to other issues com-
mon to Chapter 2506 and 119 of the Ohio Revised Code.
It is hoped that the courts will adopt the approach used in
Chapter 119 proceedings and apply it to actions under Chapter 2506
to the mutual benefit of litigants, administrative boards, and the
courts themselves.
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